This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.
I.

Introduction
The attractiveness and actual disbursement of foreign direct investment (FDI) into a given country depends on many factors, including political and economic conditions both in the host country and in the rest of the world. In particular, irreversible investment decisions under uncertainty affect the actual deployment of FDI.
Recent work in options theory (Dixit, 1992; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996) show that the traditional net present value (NPV) approach to investment decisions ignores various embedded real options in such investment. In particular, this line of research demonstrates that uncertainty with irreversible investment makes delaying such investment valuable even with a positive NPV because the resolution of uncertainty provides a window of opportunity to improve the return on investment (Pindyck 1991) . McDonald and Siegel (1986) , Pindyck (1991) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , and Trigeorgis (1996) provide analyses of the value of waiting for more information before actual commitment in investment decisions. Rivoli and Salorio (1996) extend the economics of uncertainty with an option theoretic application to foreign direct investment under uncertainty to examine the effect of irreversibility on the delay in foreign direct investment.
1 They conclude that less foreign direct investment occurs when it becomes either more delayable or less reversible under uncertainty. They enrich the existing theories of foreign direct investment by asking "when" the investment actually occurs. Rajan and Marwah (1998) also examine the choice and timing of foreign direct investment, calculating the expected discounted profits from the various actions of the firm,
II. Theoretical Framework: Investment under Uncertainty
Assume that a foreign firm gets permission from the local government for direct investment at time 0 . Now, the firm owns the rights to an investment project and the option to invest in that project at anytime. If the firm exercises the option at time , then assume that the return to the firm from the initial investment of ( 0) t > I for the project equals . More specifically, the investment project follows the geometric Brownian-motion process 
where µ and σ equal constant parameters and ε follows a Wiener process.
Once actual investment or disbursement occurs, the value of the project equals at time . Prior to actual disbursement, the value of the real option to invest equals , where the current value of the project equals V . Therefore, define V* such that
where V equals the threshold value of the project that just supports the investment without further waiting. That is, the investment decision rule says that the foreign firm actually takes an irreversible action of disbursement, if and only if, exceeds V * t V * .
8 Pindyck (1991) shows that satisfies the following differential equation:
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, r denotes the risk-free interest rate, and δ denotes the opportunity cost of delaying the actual investment. Together with the boundary conditions 8 Note that the usual NPV rule that the (discounted) value of the investment must equal its cost now becomes that the (discounted) value of the investment must exceed its cost by at least the real option value for waiting ( ) ( . Both and V ( ) F V * increase, if σ increases. In other words, uncertainty increases the value of a firm's investment opportunities, but decreases the amount of actual investing that the firm will does, since the threshold value, V*, rises. Pindyck's (1991) analysis implies that higher uncertainty induces firms to invest less and to wait longer, on average. Intuitively, firms will wait when the benefit of waiting exceeds the cost of waiting. Likewise, firms will invest when the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost.
More uncertainty makes additional investment less attractive. Thus, firms will invest less, given higher uncertainty. Rivoli and Salorio (1996) and Trigeorgis (1996) show that competition alters the value of waiting. Firms will invest sooner, rather than later, if danger exists of preemption by competitors.
In other words, firms without market power cannot enjoy the delay option, because competitive pressures make the cost of waiting higher. The prior discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The more competition among foreign entrants, the more likely firms will invest sooner.
If firms possess good information about the local host country, investing firms face less uncertainty and will accumulate less new information. In other words, the benefits of waiting fall for firms more familiar with the local host country. We hypothesize that the firms will wait less, if previous investment into Korea already exists. We also hypothesize that firms will wait less, if the foreign firm opts for a higher ownership ratio. Previous investment into Korea proxies for familiarity with local conditions. Higher ownership implies a higher commitment by foreign firms under uncertainty. Higher commitment implies either that firms exhibit risk-seeking behavior or know something about the local host country. Since we do not assume any specific attitude of firms toward risk, we associate higher ownership with better local knowledge. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The more local knowledge firms possess, the more likely firms will invest sooner. Rajan and Marwah (1998) also provide a theoretical discussion of the foreign direct investment decision, including the possibility of "wait-and-see" behavior. They consider three alternative cases: (1) invest in the foreign market immediately, (2) do not invest in the foreign market, but serve that market with exports, and (3) wait before investing in the foreign market.
Of course, the last strategy involves two choices while the firm waits: (i) invest in liquid assets or (ii) serve the foreign market with exports. Rajan and Marwah (1998) calculate the expected discounted profits for each strategy and consider the conditions under which each strategy is chosen. The "wait-and-see" strategy requires the use of the value (price) of the real option to wait. They merely hypothesize the existence of the value (price) of the real option, but do not describe the method of determining that real option value (price), such as Pindyck (1991) . 9 Rajan and Marwah (1998) conclude that policy makers need to consider strategies to improve the credibility of their liberalization program 10 and to reduce the sunk costs that firms 8 9 Although Rajan and Marwah (1998) identify a reduced-form estimating equation, they do not collect data or perform any econometric tests. 10 We add that the policy makers need to improve their reputation of not trying to extract additional revenue from firms investing in the domestic economy. That is, a time-inconsistency problem exists such that the policy makers possess an incentive to change the rules after the foreign firm invests. The problem conforms to a version of the repeated "trust game," which we discuss latter in the text.
incur with foreign direct investment. We hypothesize that the Korean government accumulates credibility and reputation over time. Thus, we proxy for credibility and reputation by the date of foreign direct investment permission. The later the date of permission, the higher the credibility and reputation. We also proxy for the sunk cost by the permitted foreign direct investment. This discussion leads to two additional hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The more credible the liberalization program and the better the reputation of the policy makers responsible for implementing that liberalization program, the more likely firms will invest sooner.
Hypothesis 4: The higher the initial sunk cost (foreign direct investment), the more likely firms will invest later.
III. Foreign Direct Investment in Korean Economic Development
Korea attracts FDI due to convenient location for exporting into other, major Asian countries, (Kim, 2002) .
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The process of liberalizing government regulation of FDI does not ensure success in promoting an investment boom. In simple terms, the situation represents a repeated "trust game,"
where the government (player 1) and individual firms (players 2) participate in the game. 14 That is, the firms must view the government's liberalization program as credible, while the government must establish a reputation that it will commit to the new policies and will not renege on them. As noted in footnote 8, the government possesses an incentive for time inconsistency, since they can experience a short-run gain by extracting more revenue from the foreign firms who have invested in the domestic economy. Since the "trust game" repeats itself, albeit with new firms, the firms who have received permission to invest can penalize the government by not investing. The government and the firms can reach a cooperative Nash 10 12 The Asian financial crisis demonstrated to Korean policymakers that FDI possesses many advantages. Mainly, it secures long-term stable foreign capital instead of the short-term bank loans and other sources of foreign borrowing that Korea used before the crisis. Furthermore, the Korean government realized that FDI brings management expertise, new technology, and alliances with foreign partners. Consequently, the government enacted several investment promotion acts. 13 Recently, China has competed vigorously with Korea to attract inward FDI.
14 Rajan and Marwah (1998) also tell a game theory story, although their analysis uses the prisoner's dilemma model.
equilibrium when the threat of punishment imposes discounted costs higher than the potential discounted gains to the government. In sum, a credible government policy and reputable government policy makers can induce larger foreign direct investment with a shorter delay.
IV. FDI Performance in Korea
Foreign direct the largest number of projects, stands only in the tenth place. Chinese FDI concentrated in this industry, but most projects showed a relatively low value. Meanwhile, financial institutes rose from tenth to second place, sorting first by ownership and then by realized projects.
Three countries lead foreign investors in the number of projects --Japan, U.S., and China. While Japan and the U.S. have retained their top positions since 1962, China draws much attention as a potential investor after entering Korea nearly 30 years later.
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V. Empirical Results
We employ duration analysis to test the four hypotheses in Section 2. Duration analysis explains the time between the permission for FDI to its actual disbursement. 18 Most duration analyses must consider a key analytical problem called censoring, where the time between permission and disbursement is not complete (i.e., disbursement is censored). Generally, three reasons can cause censoring in our FDI analysis: (1) the investment is not executed before 2002, the ending point of the data; (2) the investment disbursement is not officially reported to the Korean government;
and (3) the investment project withdraws after getting permission either due to uncertainty or some other internal reasons.
We denote the random variable for a duration time of each FDI project by T, which equals the time difference between the permission date and the execution (disbursement) date.
The censoring variable, δ, equals a dichotomous ( 12 17 The appendix provides a more detailed discussion about the FDI performance of Japan, the U.S., and China. 18 Usually economists refer to the time variable as survival time, because it gives the time that an individual has "survived" over some follow-up period. On the other hand, the event is referred to as "failure", because the kind of event of interest usually is death, disease incidence, or some other negative individual experience.
function is of interest for the following reasons: (i) it gives insight about conditional failure (execution) rates, (ii) it can identify a specific parametric model form; and (iii) it provides the vehicle by which the mathematical modeling of duration data is carried out. The conditional hazard function h(t|T i-1 ….., T 0 ) equals the conditional risk of an event (execution) at time t. It gives the instantaneous expected rate per unit time for the event to occur, given that the event has not occurred up to t i-1 :
Even though various methods exist to assess goodness of fit, uncertainty still remains about the appropriateness of a given parametric specification. 20 Cox (1972) developed a nonparametric robust approach for duration models with covariates X, the Cox proportional hazards (Cox PH) model that closely approximates the results for the correct parametric specification. A baseline hazard function h 0 (t) is modified multiplicatively by covariates so that the hazard function for any individual case is as follows:
We focus our interest on the proportional factors rather than the unspecified baseline hazard means that the likelihood formula considers probabilities for those subjects that are censored. An expression for the hazard rate (HR) emerges from the regression coefficients by substituting with the Cox model formula:
The hazard ratio shows the shift of the baseline hazard. That is, if the hazard ratio equals one, no shift occurs in the baseline hazard and, thus, the explanatory variable does not affect the hazard ratio. If the hazard ratio exceeds (falls below) one, then the explanatory variable increases (decreases) the probability of failure and, thus, reduces (increases) duration.
Columns 1 to 3 of table 3 reports the findings. First, the FDI size does not associate with a significant hazard ratio, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Therefore, it does not influence duration and uncertainty. Our estimate in this case may contain bias, since we employ the FDI permitted rather than the FDI actually disbursed. If the disbursed FDI systematically falls below the permitted FDI, our finding may falsely reject a significant effect.
Second, higher ownership associates with a hazard ratio greater than one and, thus, with a higher probability of execution. Therefore, higher ownership implies shorter duration time and lower uncertainty.
Third, familiarity with the local environment positively affects the hazard function (or hazard ratio exceeds 1) and reduces uncertainty. 22 Thus, more experience in that industry from the same country implies shorter duration. These two results support Hypothesis 2. 21 The term partial likelihood is used because the likelihood formula considers probabilities for those subjects who are censored. 22 The cumulative number of FDI projects carried out in previous years for each industry and investing country measures the local knowledge variable. For example, the experience from one country in one specific industry at the concerned time (e.g., year 2000) equals the cumulative number of performed FDI projects from 1962 up to that time (i.e., the end of 1999) for the same country within the same industry.
Fourth, the year of permission does not prove significant. That is, no evidence emerges that the credibility of the liberalization program or the reputation of the government to commit to that program improves or worsens over the sample period. This result does not support Hypothesis 3.
Fifth, FDI from China enjoys shorter duration, while FDI from U.S. experiences a longer duration. FDI from Japan may possess shorter duration, but it is insignificant.
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Sixth, the Asian crisis significantly increases the hazard rate above one, implying shorter duration. Before the crisis, the Korean government implemented its liberalization program in a cautious, piecemeal approach. After the crisis, the government adopted policies to boost the inflow of foreign capital as much as possible. Thus, the finding proves consistent with the view that Korean government policies worked effectively to attract more foreign direct investment.
Another interpretation suggests that the regulatory and bureaucratic barriers that had delayed actual disbursements before the crisis collapsed after the crisis.
Finally, a large number of industry variations exist. The service sector represents the base industry in our regressions. Industries that require longer delay include fishing, manufacture of food products, basic metals, general construction, restaurants, hotels, and financial institutes. In contrast, industries that exhibit shorter delay include retail trade and wholesale-commission trade. Compared with other industries, the service industries in Korea traditionally encompass small-and medium-sized, labor-intensive, and not knowledge-intensive firms. In that sense, the retail trade and wholesale commission sectors probably experience more competition, explaining the shorter duration according to Hypothesis 1.
15 23 The Japanese dummy variable becomes significantly negative in the sensitivity analysis. See below and Table 3 .
We conduct one robustness check on the duration specification with a variation on the "wait-and-see" concept. That is, we construct a relative time span defined as individual duration relative to the industry-year average. This specification captures the possibility that a deviation from average may reflect the investor's strategic intent. We first calculate the industry-year average duration time. Then, we divide the actual months of individual durations by that industry's average value. Note that the variable does not measure duration, but proxies for "unusual delay", if it is larger than 1. This calculation incorporates differences coming from industry and time, a "relative wait-and-see" measure. Regression results, reported in the last two columns of Table 3 and adjusted by the Huber/White's heteroscedastic robust procedures, confirm our findings in duration analysis except that both the Asian crisis dummy and the time trend prove insignificant and the dummy for Japan is now not only negative, but also significant.
VI. Conclusion
Foreign direct investment into Korea traveled through a variety of stages over the last 40 years, when the Korean economy opened to outside FDI investors. In particular, Korea attracted significant FDI after the Asian financial crisis. Swings in the number and size of inward FDI projects reflect uncertainty and lack of knowledge of local conditions by foreign investors.
We contribute to the existing literature on investment under uncertainty with an empirical duration analysis on hosting FDI, and derive the testable hypotheses to identify possible factors inducing the delay of FDI between permission time (more recently, notification time) and actual arrival time. The permission, representing the commitment of foreign investors to invest, can be withdrawn either partially or fully before actual investment, depending on the change of investment environment, which can signal uncertainty. Our findings show that, while the amount of investment does not affect duration time, higher ownership and better local knowledge possess positive effects, reducing uncertainty and duration. Further, the date of permission for FDI does not cause significant shorter or longer duration, supporting that the Korean government's commitment to its liberalization program is credible and that the reputation of the policy makers responsible for that program is good.
We also examine country and crisis dummy variables --China, the U.S., Japan, and the Asian crisis. We discover that the FDI projects from China and possibly Japan possess shorter duration while the U.S. possesses longer duration and that the Asian crisis shortened the period between project permission and execution times. Two possible reasons may explain why investment from China and Japan occur more quickly than those from the United States. First, cultural similarities may reduce uncertainty faced by Chinese and Japanese investors. In other words, the United States does not share cultural and geographical proximity. Cultural and geographic proximity may allow investors to acquire local information and knowledge more easily and quickly. Thus, cultural and geographic proximity reduces uncertainty.
Second, investors from the United States may face less fierce competition in Korea than
China and Japan. Firms with market power can enjoy the option of delaying the decision while firms without market power must choose between "go now" or "don't go" rather than "go now"
or "go later," because of possible preemption by competitors. 
Appendix:
The Evolution of Korean FDI Regulation
The regulation of foreign direct investment in Korea underwent five stages of development:
restricted FDI phase (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) , massive inducement phase (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) , selective inducement phase (1979-1983), pre-liberalization phase (1983-1991) , and liberalization phase (1992-present) .
During the restricted FDI phase (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) The selective inducement phase (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) started after the second oil shock in late 1978, which worsened the world economy and efforts at protectionism. In June 1981, provision
for FDI was again amended to reflect the new economic environment. 28 Now, the investment must exceed U.S. $100,000, while the related parties mutually agreed to the ownership ratio.
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26 Partly due to governmental efforts along with fast economic development, foreign direct investment into Korea began to increase from 1970. Favored industries included export industries, such as meat processing, product processing, and TV manufacturing; and import-substitution industries, such as viscose rayon and chemistry pulp manufacturing industries. Restricted industries included legally prohibited industries, such as tobacco producing, legally restricted industries, such as shipping service, and politically prohibited industries, such as supply and transmission of electric power. 27 In this phase, qualified industries for foreign investment included metalworking, machine and electronic industry, and large scale industries that face difficulties in establishing and operating capital, technologies, and management. Export industries that experienced difficulties and inefficiencies with securing their share of the international market also qualified. 28 The qualifying businesses to receive FDI included large-scale processing industries that domestic firms find difficult to establish and operate, such as machine engineering, metalworking engineering, electronic engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry engineering, and energy business. It also included industries that contribute to the development and utilization of domestic natural resources, manufacturing industries, such as food and medicine, regulatory framework from a positive to a negative list system. The negative list system prohibited or restricted foreign investment in certain sectors (see Table 1 ).
During the pre-liberalization with negative list system phase, the government abolished the uniform fixed ceiling on foreign direct investment of 50 percent. If the ratio of FDI fell below 50 percent, the government automatically permitted the FDI. If the ratio of FDI exceeded 50 percent, the government investigated and evaluated the adequacy of the FDI, determining whether to permit it. In terms of tax exemption, foreign investors obtained tax exemption, including the corporation tax, the income tax, the property tax, the acquisition tax, and tariffs on capitals introduced for the purpose of foreign investment.
The liberalization phase started in 1992. FDI was permitted, in principle, by filling out the appropriate reports, making government approval for foreign investment exceptional. The following industries, however, were still restricted from acquiring foreign direct investment:
public interest related business, industries harmful to health, sanitation, and the preservation of environment, industries harmful to laudable customs, and other industries prohibited by presidential decree.
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In particular, after the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government promoted FDI and gave it the utmost priority to overcome the economic crisis as well as to cope effectively with globalization. Under this new view, the government enacted epochal changes in the Foreign Investment Promotion Law, moving it from "control and regulation" to "promotion and support." percentage of realized capital to 88.7 percent, which equaled their performance in 1996, the year before the crisis. This outcome probably reflects the fact that Japan was heavily affected by the regional financial crisis, and it took time for Japan to recover.
As the second ranked Korean investor, the United States seemed to follow Japanese preferences on industries. The largest number of projects (more than 100) belonged to industries that manufacture basic metal, such as fabricated metal and motor vehicles, as well as retail and wholesale trade. U.S. ownership began high rates, but no ownership pattern existed over time. 31 China is the only one out of the top three countries that saw the average value of realized projects higher than that of withdrawn projects during the crisis period.
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